‘KILL KILL KILL’ (8)

HINDI tumutol ang PNP bilang kasangkapan ng madugo pero bigong giyera kontra droga. Tuwirang nagpagamit ito kay Gongdi at hindi nakakapagtaka na maraming opisyales ng PNP ang sabi sa sakdal na crimes against humanity na isinampa sa ICC laban kay Gongdi at mga kasapakat. Bahagi ito ng unang tsapter ng aking aklat “KILL KILL KILL Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines; Crimes Against Humanity vs. Rodrigo Duterte Et Al.”

NAGGING QUESTION. The nagging question is whether or not the PNP, as an institution, has accepted Duterte’s war on drugs and registered any opposition or warning about its illegal character. Officially, the answer is yes. But there appeared to be more than what meets the eyes. Although the rumor mill has kept on grinding yarns of speculations and interpretations, the 20-page white paper, entitled “Special Report: the State-Sponsored Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines,” gave indications that the war on drugs had a different dimension that was not openly disclosed. The alleged involvement of the communist-led National Democratic Front (NDF) was neither known nor openly discussed.

Incidentally, Duterte pitched on several occasions the possible inclusion and involvement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the war on drugs. The AFP gave an icy reception to Duterte’s advances. It somehow managed to strike a middle ground by its counterproposal to involve itself in data gathering or providing his office with intelligence information. Although it did not make its position public, the AFP was categorical to say “no” on what Duterte wanted. Except to provide intelligence information, it would not involve itself in the war against drugs. The AFP, as an institution, knows its mandate. Any inclusion or involvement in the anti-drug war is not part of its mandate. The anti-drug campaign is essentially a police issue, which is better left to the PNP. The AFP had learned its lesson during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. It did not want to bite more than it could chew.

On September 21, 1972, the AFP supported the martial law declaration by the emerging dictator Ferdinand Marcos on an essentially single issue: the alleged threat to national security by the then newly reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New People’s Army. The outlawed NPA was then composed of a few squads from the remnants of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya sa Bayan (HMB) and had an insufficient number of outdated firearms. The AFP support for martial law was ironically dismal, as it showed acquiescence to 13 years of the Marcos dictatorship. The communist threat was not that big for the AFP to bear and support the martial law government of Marcos, which later metamorphosed into an abusive, corrupt, and plundering dictatorship.

CLARITY OF THOUGHT. The PNP understood Duterte had exaggerated the magnitude and dimension of the illegal drug issue to get elected into office and obtain the people’s mandate to launch the brutal war against drugs and its users, pushers, and wholesalers. It knew Project Double Barrel and its two components, Oplan Tokhang and Oplan High Value Targets, were only good on paper but unsustainable in the long run. They were hardly implemented on the basis of their original mandate and objectives. But many police officials persisted to support Duterte – both fully and halfheartedly. They could not be blamed, but they were watchful of Duterte’s actual intentions and on what he was doing.

Although drug users, pushers, and other persons involved in drug trade were identified early in the anti-drug campaign and told to mend their ways, a number of persons, who surrendered voluntarily before their barangay officials, were later slain to indicate bad faith, deceit, and duplicity of purposes. A number underwent rehabilitation as mandated by the existing anti-drugs laws, but they were nonetheless summarily executed. Why and how these summary executions happened was a matter of conjecture. Oplan Tokhang was clear on rehabilitation and monitoring of drug users. Certain persons in the know said in confidence that the anti-drug war, even on its early stage, was just unsustainable. Duterte himself did not exactly know what to do. He was not gifted with the clarity of thought, they surmised, especially on its end game.

The white paper alleged that a faction within Duterte’s coalition attempted to take advantage of Duterte’s lack of initiative to put down the complete details on how to proceed with the anti-drug war. It took a direction far different from its original intent. It discussed lengthily the inclusion of a program, which certain alleged members (or former members) of the communist-led National Democratic Front (NDF) had included in the war on the anti-drugs project. It was their way to hijack the war on drugs to the NDF’s favor.

A month after Duterte was sworn in, the Kilusang Pagbabago (KP), a new political party formed purportedly “to protect the new president,” was launched by a group of political leaders led by then Cabinet Secretary Leoncio Evasco Jr. It was conceived to be a mass movement that originated from the top, the Office of the President, to blossom into a grassroots-based political party below. Although it was supposed to have been launched on Aug. 13, 2016, not much was heard about it. But the Dec. 5, 2016 report of rappler.com led with this paragraph: “President Rodrigo Duterte’s most trusted ally, Cabinet Secretary Leoncio ‘Jun’ Evasco Jr, is going around the country to launch a nationwide mass movement – Kilusang Pagbabago (KP).” It could be surmised that KP, which was on the drawing board since August, did not take off immediately, pushing its launching toward the end of 2016.

The news report said KP was “growing fast” as it drew huge crowds in its launching in Cebu and Cavite. Its organizers thought of organizing a KP unit in each barangay. Conceptually, it was envisioned to become the political vehicle to bring government services down to the ground. But its bigger role, it appeared, was to form a critical mass to protect Duterte, as he was supposed to pursue radical reforms, according to the rappler.com report citing a document on its creation and objectives. The KP mentioned possible destabilization plots if ever Duterte pursued “reforms” but it did not give details. In fact, KP had singled out certain police and military generals supposedly involved in illegal drug trade as enemies, giving rise to the perception of its anti-military and police bias.

KP AS ‘BROWNSHIRTS.’ There were supporters, who wanted to strengthen Dueterte’s hold to power by having a mass-based political party, while other supporters believed that KP would only bring the Duterte government closer to the Left. This was the tug-of-war during the early weeks of Duterte’s presidency. The more acceptable assessment was the planned creation of an army of supporters, or a “mass movement,” whose members could be easily converted into the equivalent of the S.A. or “Brownshirts” of the old Nazi German regime. Given Duterte’s penchant to use thugs in his war on drugs in Davao City, it could be surmised too that Evasco’s faction in the ruling coalition could have thought to create an army within the army with KP as the political vehicle to form its core of members.

Rodrigo Duterte won the 2016 presidential elections partly with the help of the Left – both the Legal left, which has the alphabet soup of Left-leaning organizations like Bayan, a mass organization, Bayan Muna Party List, Gabriela, Anakpawis, Kabataan, among others, and the outlawed extreme Left led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA), its military arm, and the National Democratic Front (NDF), its political arm. Although on official level the Left supported Grace Poe, who landed third after Duterte and Mar Roxas, the Liberal Party candidate, the Left, especially those based in Mindanao, supported Duterte instead of Poe. In brief, it played simultaneously two political cards in 2016. (Itutuloy)